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Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University. This Essay replaces my tentative
thoughts in James Iredell and the Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995). I

wish to thank the participants in Vanderbilt University's Judicial Reputation Conference. I
especially wish to thank Professors Mark Brandon, Bryan Camp, Rosemary Dillon, Scott Gerber,
and Anthony Joseph for their thoughtful comments and assistance.
1. "Many brave men lived before Agamemnon; but all are oppressed by long night, unwept
and unknown, because they lack a sacred bard." R.O.A.M. LYNE, HORACE: BEHIND THE PUBLIC
POETRY 213 (1995). Iredell probably was familiar with these lines. He read and quoted Horace's
odes. Don Higginbotham, The Making of a Revolutionary, in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL

xxxvii, xlvi (Don Higginbotham ed., 1976) [hereinafter IREDELL PAPERS]; Letter from James
Iredell to Francis Iredell, Sr. (July 20, 1772), in 1 IREDELL PAPERS, supra, at 104, 107; Letter
from James Iredell to Hanna Iredell (Nov. 18, 1780), in 2 IREDELL PAPERS, supra,at 194, 194.
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I. INTRODUCTION

John Marshall is the Agamemnon 2 of Supreme Court history.
He is universally considered the Court's greatest Justice, and rightly
so. But there were great Justices before Marshall. 3 One of those great
Justices was James Iredell. No Justice in the Court's history has
provided a more detailed or sophisticated explanation and justification
of the doctrine of judicial review. Iredell needs a bard, and this Essay
is my ode to his memory.
James Iredell was born and raised an Englishman. 4 His father
was a merchant in Bristol who had fallen on hard times, but young
Iredell had influential relatives who secured an appointment for him
as a customs officer in North Carolina. In 1768, he arrived in Edenton,
North Carolina, as a lonely seventeen-year-old. 5 His salary was paid to
his parents while he subsisted on the nontax fees that he collected for
incidental services. Fortunately, Iredell was befriended by Samuel
Johnston, 6 under whom he studied law. When the Revolution came
fewer than ten years later, Iredell had to choose between his mother
country and the rebelling colonies. On the eve of the Revolution, his
wealthy bachelor uncle in Jamaica warned him to "keep yourself
perfectly neut[ral] in those disputes" and implied that Iredell would be
disinherited if he failed to follow this avuncular advice. 7 Iredell,
however, decided to forsake his prospective inheritance and to side
with his new friends in North Carolina.8 As the Revolution progressed,
he held a number of law-related offices. He served his state as a judge

2.

If memory serves, I cribbed my title from Julius Goebel, but I cannot relocate it in his

magisterial and soporific ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971).

3.

See Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, in

SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 1, 1-21 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed.,

1998) (discussing the general neglect the pre-Marshall Court has received).
4.
For Iredell's career through the Revolution, see WILLIS WHICHARD, JUSTICE JAMES
IREDELL 3-41 (2000); Higginbotham, in 1 IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at xxxvii-xc.
5.
WHICHARD, supra note 4, at xiv.
6.
Id. Johnston was a wealthy and influential man whose uncle had been the colony's royal
Governor and who subsequently served as Governor of and Senator from North Carolina. Iredell
married Johnston's sister in 1773. For a semi-epistolary novel in which Mrs. Iredell is the title
character, see NATALIE WEXLER, A MORE OBEDIENT WIFE: A NOVEL OF THE EARLY SUPREME

COURT (2007); see also Natalie Wexler, The Case for Love: Did the Friendship of an Early
Supreme Court Justice and the Wife of a Colleague Ever Cross the Line of Propriety?, AM.
SCHOLAR, Summer 2006, at 80, 80-92 (speculating on a possible extramarital relationship
between Iredell and Mrs. Hannah Wilson, wife of Iredell's colleague, Justice James Wilson).
7.
Letter from Thomas Iredell to James Iredell (Jan. 8, 1775), in 1 IREDELL PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 279, 280.
8.
The uncle left his entire estate to Iredell's younger brother. Letter from Arthur Iredell
to James Iredell (Nov. 17, 1783), in 2 IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at 458, 458.
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of the superior court and then as attorney general. Near the war's end,
he entered private practice.9
By the time the Constitution was framed in 1787, Iredell was a
proto-Federalist who believed in the need for a strong national
government to deal with national issues. During the ratification
process, he wrote a series of newspaper essays in support of the
Constitution and was the proposed Constitution's leading advocate at
the North Carolina ratification convention. 10 His public advocacy
earned him a national reputation, and in 1789, President Washington
rewarded him with an appointment to the Supreme Court.
The mature Justice Iredell was a consummate professional who
crafted his judicial opinions to state clearly his chain of thought.11 In
one case, he explained, "I ...endeavour to state my own principles...
with so much clearness that whether my opinion be right or wrong, it
may at least be understood what the opinion really is."12 His work
epitomized comprehensive analysis and exhaustive attention to detail.
Of course, most of us have personally known and deeply respected
attorneys and judges who have lived their professional lives by these
rigorous standards. Iredell's intense professionalism made him an
admirable attorney and a very good judge, but he was more than just
admirably competent. He is entitled to the mantle of greatness
because no Justice in the nation's history ever has equaled his full,
detailed, and sophisticated explanation and justification of the
doctrine of judicial review. On this immensely important issue, he is
greater than John Marshall, our Agamemnon.13

9.
See WHICHARD, supra note 4, at 25-41 (discussing Iredell's activities during the
American Revolution).
10. Id. at 25-86.
11. In legal writing, however, clarity does not always mean simple and straightforward.
Lawyers and judges must frequently address complex problems, and a complete answer to a
complex problem usually requires complex writing.
12. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S.'(3 Dall.) 54, 92 (1795).
13. Two other Founders, Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson, presented thoughtful
explanations of judicial review in the late 1780s and early 1790s. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the manner of constituting the judiciary department of the
proposed government); 1 JAMES WILSON, Lecture on Law: Of Man, as a Member of a
Confederation, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 319, 329-30 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
These works so closely track Iredell's reasoning that one capable scholar has concluded that they
were consciously based upon Iredell's earlier analysis. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 46 (1990). Neither Hamilton nor Wilson, however, grappled with
the thinking of John Locke and the existing English model. See infra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text. Nor did they offer Iredell's detailed and comprehensive analysis of the
factors restraining judges' exercise of the power of judicial review. See infra notes 52-65 and
accompanying text.
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If James Iredell's explanation of judicial review is superior to
John Marshall's, why has he languished in virtual obscurity? Why has
he lain virtually unknown for a long night of two centuries? Some
years ago, a survey of law school deans and professors of law, history,
and political science ranked the abilities of all the Justices who had
served on1 4 the Court. In this survey, Iredell was considered just
"average." People regard him as mediocre for many reasons. In part,
perceived greatness is a simple function of nearness in time, and no
one who knew him has been alive for 150 years. 15 Iredell died over two
centuries ago. More significantly, our very understanding of what laws
are and what courts do has changed radically over the last two
centuries. The pre-Marshall Court does not conform to the current
understanding of the Supreme Court's function under the
Constitution. Finally, contemporary jurisprudential notions regarding
the nature of law subtly, but significantly, distort our evaluation of his
6
most significant writings.'
My ode to Iredell begins with brief sketches of the current
understanding of the Supreme Court's role and the pragmatic
jurisprudence of legal positivism that predominates in contemporary
legal culture. 17 These present-day concepts distort modern observers'
understanding of Iredell and his fellow Justices. Then, the Essay
turns to James Iredell, the constitutional theorist. His greatest
contribution was a powerful and fully elaborated theory of judicial
review.' 8 The Essay also explores his theory's implications for the
judicial task of interpreting the Constitution. Finally, Iredell's
14.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS app. A, at 412-13 (3d ed. 1992). Iredell

has never been considered a "great" by authors attempting to rank judges. See, e.g., Robert
Bradley, Selecting and Ranking Great Justices: Poll Results, in LEADERS OF THE PACK: POLLS &
CASE STUDIES OF GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1, 1-22 (William D. Pederson & Norman W.

Provizer eds., 2003) (recording the results of eight independent polls). But every poll lists
Marshall as the greatest Justice. Id.
If Iredell had been a baseball player, he would not have made today's Hall of Fame. Experts
have concluded that as a baseball player, Justice Iredell would have been most like Wilcy Moore.
Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Media, James Iredell, http://www.oyez.org/justices/james-iredell
(follow "Wilcy Moore" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). Moore pitched for the Boston Red
Sox and the New York Yankees before World War II. Needless to say, the same experts
concluded that John Marshall would have been Babe Ruth. Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Media,
John Marshall, http://www.oyez.org/justices/john-marshall (follow "Babe Ruth" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 6, 2009).
15. Our Agamemnon (Marshall) is the exception that makes the rule. In the most recent
composite poll, Justices Holmes and Cardozo are the earliest "greats." Bradley, supra note 14, at
12. Even among scholars, Justice Harlan I (again excepting Marshall) is the earliest "great." Id.
at 10.
16. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 44-78 and accompanying text.
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constitutional writings illustrate the extent to which our twenty-first
century vision of the Supreme Court in contemporary society can
distort our understanding of law and society in the early republic. 19
This anachronistic distortion is a running theme of my ode.
II. TODAY'S LEGAL MILIEU
Today, we have a pluralistic country, and we tend to view
political society in terms of conflicts of values and interests. Through
this lens, the Supreme Court's greatness stems from its ability to
resolve conflicts and impose its judgments upon others-particularly
upon other branches of government. In my experiences, the modern
paradigms of great Supreme Court decisions are Marbury v. Madison
and Brown v. Board of Education.20 In Marbury, the Court established
its authority to use the power of judicial review to overturn politicalbranch decisions. 2 1 In Brown, the Court struck boldly at a national
disgrace when state governments and the rest of the federal
government were morally paralyzed. 22 In each of these cases, the
Court was in conflict with powerful societal forces and firmly
reiterated its constitutional role as a shield against abuses of
governmental power. These were great cases because the Court was
opposing governmental policy rather than supporting it.
The guiding principle of the early Supreme Court, however,
was precisely to the contrary. The early Court sought to support the
political branches of the new federal government, not to oppose
them.2 3 The new federal government was a political experiment whose
success was not guaranteed. In this hazy political climate, judicial
opposition to the new government might have been disastrous. The
24
early Justices operated within a paradigm of support-not conflict.

19.
20.

See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 247 (1995).

21.

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 64 (5th ed. 2003).
22. See Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 42130 (1960) (refuting feeble arguments that segregation was not harmful or degrading). While state
and local governments in the South imposed their despicable tenet of racism upon the citizenry,
morally challenged southern senators used a variety of procedural tools to block efforts in

Congress to remedy the nation's shame. See 2 ROBERT

CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON:

MASTER OF THE SENATE 89-105, 182-202 (2002).
23.

CASTO, supra note 20, at 247-49.

24. Id.; William Caste, Oliver Ellsworth, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 73, 88 (1996) (noting the
inclination of Chief Justice Ellsworth to defend the actions of the Washington and Adams
administrations).
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The early Supreme Court's paradigm of support was
significantly bolstered by a unique harmony of purpose and philosophy
between the Court and the political branches that has never been
repeated in the succeeding centuries. 2 5 Throughout the 1790s, two
Federalists, Washington and John Adams, headed the executive
branch, and all the Justices were Federalists. In fact, Washington
picked all but two of the Justices. 26 Likewise, throughout the decade,
Federalists always had at least working control of the Senate and
sometimes a similar control of the House. While this effective control
could not guarantee enactment of Federalist legislation, it was always
sufficient to preclude legislation that the Federalists deemed unwise.
Therefore, the Justices never found themselves in serious conflict with
the political branches. The Court dutifully could accept and support
the Federalist government's policies without a qualm.
The
never-to-be-repeated,
historical
coincidence
of
thoroughgoing unity between the Court and the political branches
barred the Court from achieving greatness under our modern
paradigm of conflict. Today, the entire pre-Marshall Court usually is
dismissed as a mediocre collection of reasonably competent jurists.
Our modern vision of mediocrity is present in the survey that rated
Iredell just "average."27 None of his brethren were "great" or "near
great," and none was a "failure." Ten were "average" and two were
"below average." One scholar has dismissed the story of the preMarshall Court as comparable to "a play's opening moments with
28
minor characters exchanging trivialities."
A change from natural law to legal positivism has also subtly
but powerfully influenced today's views of Justice Iredell. A legal
positivist believes that laws come from government and do not exist
unless they have been legislated by a governmental entity with
lawmaking authority. 29 There may be significant theoretical objections
to legal positivism; 30 nonetheless, American lawyers of the early

25.

CASTO, supra note 20, at 249.

26. President Adams appointed Bushrod Washington and Alfred Moore.
27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. Gerber, supra note 3, at 2 (quoting ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT 30 (1960)).
29. See William Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of ConstitutionalRevolutions,
62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 921-27 (1988) ("[T]he common law system is a system of positive laws set by
the sovereign using the medium of judicial opinions. In other words, the judicial branch of
government-like the legislative-performs a lawmaking function.").
30. For example, under legal positivism, a particular legal rule established by a proper
lawmaking entity is the law without regard to whether the rule is desirable, undesirable, moral,
or immoral. The problem of amorality is ably discussed in Andrei Marmor, Exclusive Legal
Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 104, 104-24
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twenty-first century are predominantly positivists. This is not to say
that most lawyers have ever given any serious thought to the
jurisprudential question, "What is law?" Many have not. Nevertheless,
legal positivism pervades our legal culture to such an extent that it is
embraced routinely and unwittingly. At least American lawyers are
positivist to the extent that they believe that the judicial process
involves a highly specialized form of lawmaking.
Two centuries ago, there were no legal positivists in the United
States. American lawyers were natural lawyers who believed that
laws existed in nature without regard to the existence of
government. 31 They believed that what we call "laws" are like the law
of gravity. These laws exist without any need of government
intervention. Natural laws are revealed to mankind through our
ability to think rationally and through divine revelation. Our
ancestors' natural law vision pictured judges as using their intellect to
discern principles that existed in nature.
Today's American lawyers simply do not believe in natural law.
We believe that judges make laws-that they legislate rules. 32 Our
34
current faith 33 originated in innovative analyses of the common law,
but this revolutionary vision of judges exercising legislative
jurisdiction is equally pertinent to statutory and constitutional
interpretation. If the words of a written rule are subject to plausible,
yet different interpretations, a judge must choose. Unlike with the
legislative and executive branches, our traditions severely limit the
judiciary's power to refuse to decide. Once a judge has selected a
particular interpretation, the doctrine of precedent requires that the
judge's opinion be followed in future cases. The judge has, in effect,
supplemented or changed the words of the statute or constitution. In
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). But cf. Kenneth Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra, at 125, 125-65

(explaining that the theory of inclusive positivism provides that there can be moral criteria of
legal validity).
31. See Casto, supra note 29, at 913-14 (describing American attorneys' acceptance during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of William Blackstone's Commentaries,which
explained that judges were "living oracles" of natural law ordained by God).
32.

See BENJAMIN

CARDOZO,

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

103-41

(1921)

(describing the evolution from natural law to positive law, which conceives of the "judge as
legislator").
33. The Founders' natural law faith was internally consistent and not subject to logical
refutation just as today's predominant concept of legal positivism is not subject to logical
refutation. Our journey from natural law to legal positivism involved a complex interaction of
factors including the Civil War, Charles Darwin's theory, legal education, the failure of American
states to adopt uniform principals of common law, and changing views regarding God's
stewardship of human society. Casto, supranote 29, at 938-48.
34. See id. at 921-22, 962 n.99 (discussing John Austin and Jeremy Bentham).
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my experience, this vision of judicial lawmaking is a fundamental
paradigm that informs all lawyers' analyses and understandings of
modern law.
In the early twenty-first century, lawyers who believe that
courts legislate laws have properly elevated the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinions to the pinnacle of judicial authority. No political power
outside the Supreme Court trumps the Court's determination of an
issue of constitutional law. 35 We have a deep thirst to understand the
Court's actions because the Court is the final arbiter of most federal
law and virtually all constitutional law. The Court's pronouncements
are not necessarily wise, but the Justices have the final word. As
Justice Jackson famously quipped, the Court's decisions are "not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final."36 By coincidence, most of Justice Iredell's writing on judicial
review does not appear in his Supreme Court opinions. 3 7 Therefore,
modern lawyers are inclined to ignore his ideas because they are not
the law.

III. IREDELL'S AND MARSHALL'S UNDERSTANDINGS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The story of John Marshall's opinion in Marbury has been told
countless times 38 and need not be retold here. But Iredell's
understanding of judicial review is worth explaining to demonstrate
the self-evident superiority of his written analysis. The idea of judicial
review did not spring full-grown from Iredell's forehead. North
Carolina's governor recognized the importance of judicial review as
early as 1781.39 Iredell himself first alluded to the concept of judicial
review two years later in instructions that he wrote to his county's
40
representatives in the North Carolina legislature.

35. Rare episodes like the Eleventh and Sixteenth Amendments to the Constitution can be
dismissed as exceptions that make the rule.
36. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
37. See infra notes 43, 49-81 and accompanying text.
38. See FALLON, supra note 21, at 63 n.1 (listing multiple sources which provide historical
background and analysis of Marshall's opinion); id. at 4 n.A (Supp. 2008).
39. Thomas Burke, Questions and Propositions by the Governor (July 25, 1781), reprinted
in Scott Gerber, Unburied Treasure: Governor Thomas Burke and the Origins of JudicialReview,
8 HISTORICALLY SPEAKING, July-Aug. 2007, at 29, 29-30.
40. James Iredell, Instructions to Chowan County Representatives (Sept. 1783), in 2
IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at 446, 449 ("[A] truly independent [judiciary] ...is a point of the
utmost moment in a Republic where the Law is superior to any or all the Individuals, and the
Constitution superior even to the Legislative, and of which the Judges are the guardians and
protectors.").
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Iredell embarked upon a sophisticated and detailed exploration
of the matter in the late 1780s before the Superior Court of North
Carolina in Bayard v. Singleton.4 1 Bayard was an ejectment action to
regain possession of property that had been confiscated and sold by
the state during the Revolutionary War. In order to prevail, the
plaintiff had to convince the court to declare unconstitutional a state
statute calling for the dismissal of such suits. The court ruled
eventually that the statute was indeed invalid because it violated the
North Carolina Constitution's guarantee of trial by jury. The nature of
Iredell's participation in Bayard is unclear, 42 but he argued forcefully
in a published essay and a private letter that the court had the power
to declare the statute void. 43 Iredell developed his theory of judicial
review in the context of the North Carolina Constitution, but his
theory is equally applicable to any other written constitution,
including the U.S. Constitution.
A. The People's Sovereignty
Like Iredell, John Marshall based judicial review on the
people's sovereignty. 44 Because the Constitution came from the people,
41. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42 (1787). The case's background is ably discussed in Introduction, in 3
IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at xxv, xxxiv-xxxvii; see also id. at 299 n.2, 332-33 n.2.
42. In anticipation of the litigation, the defendant placed most of the state's able attorneys,
including Iredell, on retainer. The official report says that Iredell represented the plaintiff, but
the court dockets do not indicate this. Introduction,in 3 IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at xxxvxxxvi. Perhaps he appeared in an amicus capacity. WHICHARD, supra note 4, at 11-12.
43. Iredell published his initial thoughts in a newspaper essay in 1786. James Iredell, An
Elector (Aug. 17, 1786), in 3 IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at 227, 227-31 [hereinafter An
Elector]. After the court held that it could exercise the power of judicial review, Iredell's friend,
Richard Spaight, who was at the Philadelphia Convention, wrote Iredell a letter criticizing the
court's decision as an undesirable arrogation of judicial power. Letter from Richard Spaight to
James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 3 IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at 297, 297-99 [hereinafter
Spaight Letter]. Iredell responded in a lengthy letter that repeated and elaborated upon his
earlier newspaper essay. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 3
IREDELL PAPERS, supra note 1, at 307, 307-10 [hereinafter Iredell Letter]. Although Iredell wrote
this letter to Spaight a year after he wrote his newspaper essay, the two writings are consistent
with each other. For purposes of analysis, the two writings will be treated as a single, extended
essay.
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). For Marshall, Iredell, and
their fellow Americans, the people's sovereignty was a matter of faith. The idea played a crucial
role in justifying the Revolutionary War and figured significantly in the drafting and ratification
of the Federal Constitution. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 55-262
(1988) (describing the new ideology required "to justify a government in which the authority of
kings stood below that of the people or their representatives"); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 chs. IX, XIII, XV (1969) (describing the important role of
popular sovereignty in the founding of America, including the drafting of the Articles of
Confederation, the adoption of the Bill of Rights, bicameralism, and other elements of the
Constitution, and the development of a democratic republic). Who the people were and whether
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legislative acts contrary to the Constitution are contrary to the
people's will and therefore must give way. According to Marshall's
opinion, it was as simple as that.4 5 In fairness to Marshall, he did not
present his rationale as a comprehensive discussion of judicial review.
He noted that the question of whether courts may exercise the power
of judicial review "is a question deeply interesting to the United
States." 46 Nevertheless, he believed that the answer to the question is
"happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. '47 He viewed
the issue as resting on "principles ... long and well established"48 and
therefore saw no need for extensive elaboration.
Like Marshall and all subsequent American attorneys who
have considered the issue, Iredell believed written constitutions are
fundamental in the sense that they create limited governments,
including legislatures. Also like Marshall, Iredell's entire analysis
rested upon the people's sovereignty. He believed that ultimate
sovereignty resides not in the government or any of its branches, but
in the people. In another context, he stated forthrightly that "the
people are avowedly the fountain of all power."49 The Revolutionary
War was a dramatic instance of the people exercising their ultimate
sovereignty, and Iredell was a direct participant in that process. This
political belief was further strengthened by the practical experience of
having seen the people exercise their sovereignty through adoption of
written state constitutions during and after the war.
From the postulate of the people's sovereignty, Iredell drew the
corollary that the will of the people as expressed in a constitution is
superior to any legislative enactment. He explained:

they really had the capacity of exercising their will were questions that presented serious
problems of proof. MORGAN, supra. Moreover, the idea of the people's sovereignty should not be
confused with popular sovereignty. In late eighteenth-century America, only one person in six
could vote. FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 161-62 (1985). Nevertheless, the
people's sovereignty was a fundamental postulate that the Founders accepted on faith.
45. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77 ("Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void.").
46. Id. at 176.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 11 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Burt Franklin Reprints 2d ed. 1974) (1845) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; accord United States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23, 29-30 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No.
15,834) (Iredell, J.) ("[E]very legitimate act of government is in effect an act of the people
themselves; it emanating from their authority either expressly or impliedly given.").
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The people have chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They have not
chosen to be governed, or promised to submit upon any other; and the Assembly have no
more right to obedience on other terms, than any different power on earth has a right to
govern us; for we have as much agreed to be governed by the Turkish Divan as by our
50
own General Assembly, otherwise than on the express terms prescribed.

In other words, Iredell viewed the North Carolina Constitution as
literally a "real, original contract between the people and their future
Government."'5 1 It was not a theoretical social contract like the English
Constitution. Moreover, the existence of a written constitution has
significant implications for the judicial process. Iredell explained that
a written constitution is not "a mere imaginary thing, about which ten
thousand different opinions may be formed, & to which therefore the
'52
Judges cannot willfully blind themselves.
Today, a common criticism of Marshall's opinion in Marbury is
that he failed to explain why the judiciary's interpretation of the
Constitution is to be preferred over that of the legislature.5 3 Iredell
fully anticipated this criticism and, unlike Marshall, presented a
detailed justification for preferring judicial interpretations. He began
with a purely political argument based upon visceral experience. In
forming their constitution or original contract, the people were
perfectly familiar with the idea of vesting the legislature with
absolute, unreviewable powers. Iredell reminded his readers that this

50. An Elector, supra note 43, at 228.
51. Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 307. This metaphor and idea was by no means unique.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 17 (1782) (describing the Constitution as
"written record of that which the citizens of this state have adopted as their social compact"). See
generally WOOD, supra note 44, ch. VII (describing the conception of a contract between the
rulers and the colonists in early America and the influence of this image on the drafting of the
Constitution). A year later Iredell noted an important refinement of his contract analogy. In the
North Carolina ratification debates, he explained:
A compact cannot be annulled but by the consent of both parties; therefore,
unless the rulers are guilty of oppression, the people, on the principle of a
compact, have no right to new-model their government. This is held to be the
principle of some monarchical governments in Europe. Our government is
founded on much nobler principles. The people are known with certainty to
have originated it themselves. Those in power are their servants and agents;
and the people, without their consent, may new-model their government
whenever they think proper, not merely because it is oppressively exercised,
but because they think another form will be more conducive to their welfare.
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 49, at 9; see also Caton, 8 Va. at 10-11 (stating that the power to
pardon was taken from the executive in order "to enable the whole legislature to provide for the
public safety"). For other statements of this refinement and its significance, see WOOD, supra
note 44, at 600-02.
52. Iredell Letter, supranote 43, at 308-09; see also id. at 307.
53. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 2-14 (1967) (stating that the Constitution neither supports nor disavows
Marshall's interpretation of judicial review).
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was the model of the unwritten English Constitution and that they
54
"had severely smarted under its effects."
After this visceral political argument, Iredell turned to political
theory. Iredell understood fully the "great argument... that though
the Assembly have not a right to violate the constitution, yet if they in
fact do so, the only remedy is, either by a humble petition that the law
may be repealed, or a universal resistance of the people." Unlike
Marshall, Iredell directly confronted John Locke's idea that the
legislative branch is the supreme branch of government and that the
proper remedy for legislative abuse was for the people to dissolve the
government. 55 Having just lived through a long, bloody, and
economically catastrophic revolution, Iredell condemned resistance as
a "dreadful expedient" and a "calamitous contingency." 56 Moreover,
universal resistance would be feasible only in the face of "universal
[governmental] oppression" and therefore would not protect effectively
the rights of those in the minority. 57 He "indigna[ntly]" rejected out of
hand the "humble" remedy of petition as quite contrary to the
sovereign relationship between the people and the legislature. "[T]he
remedy by petition implies a supposition, that the electors hold their
55
rights by the favour of their representatives."
Although the people had a theoretical power to check
unconstitutional action by resistance or rebellion, Iredell understood
that the people could always redress legislative abuse by elections. In
1776, when the North Carolina Constitution was being framed,
Samuel Johnston, Iredell's brother-in-law, mentor, and friend, had
written Iredell that "[t]he great difficulty in our way is how to
establish a Check on the Representatives of the people." 59 Echoing
Locke, Johnston concluded, "there can be no check on the
Representatives of the People in a Democracy but the people
themselves, and in order that the check may be the more effectual I

54.

An Elector, supranote 43, at 227; see also Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 307.

55.

See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT chs. XIII, XIX (J.W.

Gough ed., rev. ed. 1948) ("In all cases whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the
supreme power . . . . [A]nother way whereby governments are dissolved . . . is when the

legislative or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust."). The English rule of
legislative supremacy is clearly stated in WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *91; see also

id. at *49, *157 (emphasizing that all other powers of the state must obey the legislature in order
to uphold the constitution).
56. An Elector, supra note 43, at 229.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 228; see also Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 307, 310.
59. Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Apr. 20, 1776), in 1 IREDELL PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 350, 350.
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would have Annual elections." 60 A decade later, when Iredell penned
his comprehensive analysis of judicial review, he concluded that the
remedy of "a new election [is] of very little consequence." 61 Like
universal resistance, the electoral remedy requires the concerted
action of a majority of the citizenry. Iredell believed "every Citizen...
should have a surer pledge for his constitutional Rights than the
Wisdom and activity of any occasional Majority of his Fellow Citizens,
who, if their own rights are in fact unmolested, may care very little for
his."62 Iredell's analysis of the electoral process identifies a structural
deficiency in the voters' ability to correct a legislature's
unconstitutional misconduct. The remedy of a new election is effective
only when a majority of the electorate believes that the legislature is
acting improperly, and the electorate is willing to cast correcting
votes. Given this structural deficiency, judicial review is necessary to
preserve the constitutional rights of those in the minority. Some have
argued that judicial review was limited originally to a comparatively
narrow range of situations in which an unconstitutional act impinges
on the principle of separation of powers by impairing "the performance
of essential functions." 63 Iredell's concern about protecting the
constitutional rights of those in the minority supports a significantly
broader scope of judicial review.
Although Iredell saw the judiciary as a protector of individuals'
rights under a written constitution, he was well aware of the
possibility that the judges might abuse their power. His friend,
Richard Spaight, like many others, distrusted the judiciary. Spaight
asked Iredell, "If [judges] possessed the power [of judicial review],
what check or controul would there be to their proceedings?" 64 To
reassure his friend, Iredell suggested several structural checks to
judicial abuse.
First, judges are limited by the nature of the judicial process.
Iredell denied emphatically "that the Judges are appointed Arbiters, &
to determine as it were upon any application, whether the Assembly
have or have not violated the Constitution; but when an Act is
60. Id. at 350-51; accord Spaight Letter, supra note 43, at 299.
61. Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 310.
62. Id.; see also Burke, supra note 39 (finding that judicial review "protect[s] Individuals
from the operation of Laws unconstitutional").
63.

ROBERT CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

101 (1989); see also

William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 561-62 (2005)
(asserting that the level of scrutiny applied in judicial review depended upon the type of statute
involved and whether the statute violated the separation of powers).
64. Spaight Letter, supra note 43, at 298. See generally WOOD, supra note 44, at 301-05
(describing the ambivalent attitudes of early Americans toward judicial discretion and the fear
that the power of judicial review would place judges above the representatives of the people).
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necessarily brought in Judgment before them, they must, unavoidably,
determine one way or another." 65 This idea is readily recognizable as a
nascent version of the "case or controversy" limitation that has come
to play such a prominent role under the U.S. Constitution. 66
Iredell proceeded to adduce several other factors that would
control judicial abuse. He began by noting that "it is the interest of
every Man ambitious of public distinction to make himself pleasing to
the People[, and] it is in no Man's interest, certainly to make himself
67
odious to the people by giving unnecessary and wanton offence."
Moreover, under the North Carolina Constitution-unlike the
subsequent Federal Constitution-the judges' salaries were subject to
legislative reduction. Iredell believed that this power of the purse
likely would "prevent a wanton abuse of [judicial] power."6 8 Iredell
69
also noted that the legislature might remove judges from office.
Nevertheless, he believed that legislative control over salaries was, on
balance, undesirable. Foreshadowing the Federal Constitution's
establishment of a more complete judicial independence, he cautioned
that North Carolina's legislative control over judicial salaries "may in
some instances produce an actual bias the other way, which, in my
humble opinion, is the great danger to be apprehended. '70 In other
words, Iredell understood that the power over judicial salaries could
be used to control judicial abuse, but he thought that the greater
danger was that the legislature might use the power to exert an
improper influence on the judiciary.
Finally, Iredell offered a pragmatic-even cynical-argument.
In any event, "if the Judges should be disposed to abuse their
power... they have means enough of doing so" merely by
misconstruing the meaning of legislative acts. Therefore, denying
judges the power of judicial review would not restrain them effectively
because they could still misconstrue statutes. 71 He explained "those
72
Acts may be wilfully misconstrued as well as the constitution."
Notwithstanding these restraints upon judicial abuse, Iredell
admitted that the power of judicial review "isindeed alarming,"
because under the North Carolina Constitution there was no court of
appeals to review the state's primary trial court. Iredell concluded, "I
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Iredell Letter, supranote 43, at 308.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 309.
An Elector, supranote 43, at 230; accord Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 310.
An Elector, supranote 43, at 230; accordIredell Letter, supra note 43, at 309.
An Elector, supranote 43, at 230.
Id. at 230.
Id.; accord Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 309.
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don't think any Country can be safe without some Court of Appeal
that has no original jurisdiction at all, since Men are commonly
careful enough to correct the Errors of others, though seldom
sufficiently watchful of their own, especially if they have no check
upon them."73 This much-desired improvement was also more or less
74
realized under the Federal Constitution.
Iredell was a sophisticated attorney who understood fully that
judges were capable of misconstruing the Constitution and thus
substituting their judicial will for the will of the people. He divided
this problem of judicial misconstruction into two general categories:
The judges might willfully and knowingly reject the Constitution's
clear meaning, or the judges might be forced to construe an ambiguous
constitutional provision that had no clear meaning. 75 In either case a
declaration that a statute was unconstitutional could not be described
as the simple enforcement of the people's will. Iredell was troubled by
the possibility of abuse and, as noted above, adduced several factors
that would constrain abuse. 76 He also believed that objections that
judges might abuse their power "if applicable at all, will reach all
judicial power whatever."77 Moreover, "when once you establish the
necessary existence of any power, the argument as to abuse ceases to
destroy its validity."7 8 Iredell simply was unwilling to renounce
judicial review because an occasional aberrant judge might abuse the
power willfully.
B. Iredell's Theory and the Proper Constructionof the Constitution
Iredell's theory of judicial review only worked because the
people's sovereign and constitutional will was memorialized in a
written constitution. Without a written constitution for guidance, a
judge's opinion on constitutional principles would not be based directly
on the people's will. To repeat, "the Constitution [was] not ...a mere
imaginary thing, about which ten thousand different opinions may be
79
formed, but a written document to which all may have recourse."
Under Iredell's theory, judicial review was a ministerial power. The
judges read the Constitution and give effect to its self-evident

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 310.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See An Elector, supra note 43, at 230; Iredell Letter, supra note 43, 309-10.
See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
Iredell Letter, supranote 43, at 308.
Id.
Id. at 308-09.
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meaning.8 0 Today, the most troubling aspect of judicial review involves
unclear cases in which judges give an ambiguous constitutional
provision a good-faith judicial construction. In these cases, judicial
review turns on judicial discretion rather than the ministerial
implementation of the people's will. Iredell anticipated this modern
criticism. Consistent with his theory, he renounced judicial review in
these cases. "In all doubtful cases, to be sure," he wrote, "[legislation]
ought to be supported; it should be unconstitutional beyond dispute
'8 1
before it is pronounced such."
Throughout the 1790s, Justice Iredell and his fellow Justices
frequently reiterated the idea that the power of judicial review should
be exercised only when the statute in question was "unconstitutional
beyond dispute." 82 Absent this rule of construction, the people's80. Marshall also noted the fact that the Constitution was written but did not explain the
epistemological significance of a written constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803).
81. Iredell Letter, supra note 43, at 310. James Thayer famously reiterated this
interpretive corollary a hundred years later in The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) ("[The Court] can only disregard the Act
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
very clear one."). He did not, however, base the corollary on the people's sovereignty. Instead, he
adduced the rule using a common law methodology based more upon the doctrine of precedent.
Given Iredell's analysis and the fact that it was generally accepted by his contemporaries,
modern efforts to divine the Founding Generation's view of "judicial supremacy" are
anachronistic. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial
Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 279-82 (1992) (detailing briefly the evolution of judicial supremacy);
G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463,
1467-84 (2003) (exploring successive understandings of Marbury and how those understandings
have varied with the courts' views on the relationship between actors in the American
constitutional order); see also CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 76-79 (1986). Under Iredell's
analysis, a Supreme Court decision was binding upon coordinate branches of government and,
indeed, the entire nation, But the authoritativeness of the Court's pronouncements was based
upon the people's directives rather than judicial supremacy. If a statute was unconstitutional
beyond a doubt, its self-evident unconstitutionality was clear to everyone. Professor Gerald
Leonard argues oddly that Iredell did not actually believe in the doubtful-case limitation and
simply included it in his private letter to reassure an unsophisticated layman. Gerald Leonard,
Iredell Reclaimed: Farewell to Snowiss's History of JudicialReview, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 867,
880-81 (2006). Professor Leonard apparently did not know that Iredell reiterated the doubtfulcase corollary in judicial opinions. See infra note 82. At least Professor Leonard does not mention
these cases. Nor does he mention Iredell's opinions in Minge v. Gilmour and Calder v. Bull in
which Iredell was concerned that, except in a clear case, there is no reason to prefer a judicial
interpretation over a legislative interpretation of fundamental law. See infra notes 114-29 and
accompanying text.
82. For Iredell's ideas, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.,
concurring) (requiring a "clear and urgent case" to declare a statute void); Minge v. Gilmour, 17
F. Cas. 440, 442 (C.C.D.N.C. 1798) (No. 9631) (stating that the statute would be void if "plainly
unwarranted"); see also United States v. Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370, 373 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797)
(finding that the statute's unconstitutionality was "plain"); Treanor, supra note 63, at 527-30
(discussing United States v. Villato). For the other Justices, see Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
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sovereignty rationale for judicial review would collapse. As long as the
judges were simply enforcing the clear intent of the people, the conflict
was between the legislature and the people. If, however, the
Constitution were unclear, the conflict was between the legislature's
interpretation of the Constitution and the judiciary's interpretation.
83
In an unclear case, the Lockean vision of legislative supremacy
should prevail. Justice Iredell believed that when the basis for judicial
review is ambiguous, the legislature is "possessed of an equal right of
84
opinion."
Although Iredell's doubtful-case corollary limited the scope of
judicial review significantly, the corollary did not forbid review.
Because Iredell premised judicial review on the people's sovereignty,
he necessarily paid particular attention to the Constitution's text as
the best evidence of the people's sovereign will. He did not, however,
engage in simplistic, plain-meaning analyses. His interpretations were
nuanced and thoughtful. He typically sought to mesh the evident
purpose of a constitutional provision with its text. His careful parsing
led him on at least two occasions to decide that specific legislative acts
8 5
were unconstitutional.
Iredell delivered his most comprehensive opinion declaring an
act of Congress unconstitutional in United States v. Ravara,8 6 a

14, 18 (1800) (Washington, J., concurring) ("The presumption, indeed, must always be in favor of
the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated."); id. at 19 (Paterson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]o authorize this Court to pronounce any law void, it must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication."); Calder,
3 U.S. at 395 (Chase, J.) ("[I]f I ever exercise the jurisdiction I will not decide any law to be void,
but in a very clear case."); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174.(1796) (Chase, J.)
(noting that, if he had the power to declare a statute void, he would exercise it only in a "very
clear case"); United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (Wilson, J.).
83. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
84. Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring); see also Minge, 17 F. Cas. at 444 (noting
that natural justice did not provide sufficient authority for a judge to overturn an act by the
legislature). Minge is discussed in more detail infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
85. One such occasion arose in Ravara. For a detailed discussion of Ravara, see infra text
accompanying notes 86-97. When Congress directed the Justices while riding circuit to
determine the eligibility of claimants for Revolutionary War pensions, Iredell and his brethren
refused. See CASTO, supra note 20, at 175-78. In a letter to President Washington, Iredell
explained that the Act was unconstitutional. Letter from James Iredell and John Sitgreaves to
George Washington (June 8, 1792), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 284, 284-88 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
86. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793). For an excellent discussion of the case, see John
Gordan III, United States v. Ravara: "PresumptuousEvidence," "Too Many Lawyers," and a
Federal Common Law Crime, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY

ACT OF 1789, at 106, 106 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). There are three versions of the court's
decision in Ravara. Iredell prepared a typically comprehensive written opinion that he delivered
in court. James Iredell, Handwritten Copy of Ravara Opinion (1793) (unpublished manuscript,
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criminal prosecution against the Genoese consul in Philadelphia.
Although the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with an original
or trial jurisdiction in cases "affecting diplomats," the U.S. Attorney
commenced the prosecution in a federal circuit court.87 Counsel for the
defendant contended that the Constitution made the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction exclusive. Iredell's fellow judges in the case,
Justice Wilson and District Judge Peters, held that the jurisdictional
Act did not violate the Constitution. They believed "that tho' an Act of
Congress plainly contrary to the Constitution was void, yet no such
88
construction should be given in a doubtful case."
Iredell dissented. He believed that the prosecution in a lower
court was clearly unconstitutional. In seeking the Constitution's
89
meaning, he began with the purpose of the provision in question.
Iredell believed that the Court was given original jurisdiction rather
than appellate jurisdiction over diplomat and state-as-party cases "on
account of their superior importance to the peace & welfare of the
Union."90 In cases involving diplomats,
The laws of Nations ... are not so decided as to be clear of any cavil and difficulty and
there is perhaps no subject upon which a Foreign War might be more likely to arise than

on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review and the Charles E. Johnson Papers, North Carolina
State Archives) [hereinafter Iredell's Ravara Opinion]. Iredell's Ravara Opinion is reprinted
infra app. A. In addition, he later jotted down from memory the gist of his dissenting opinion and
Justice Wilson's majority opinion. James Iredell, Recollection of the Opinions in Ravara (1973)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review and the McDougal Papers,
Historical Society of New York) [hereinafter Iredell's Recollection]. Iredell's Recollection is
reprinted infra app. B. Dallas's official report of the case is simply Dallas's sketchy recollection of
what the judges said and is quite inadequate. Only an inveterate legal positivist would prefer
Dallas's vague hearsay recollection to Iredell's comprehensive manuscript that by historical
happenstance has never been published.
87. The Constitution provides for original Supreme Court jurisdiction over "all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. For
the distinction between ambassadors and ministers, see WILLIAM CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 3-4 (2007). Under the law of nations,

ambassadors and ministers are entitled to more respect and protection than are consuls, and
Iredell was aware of this distinction. Iredell's Ravara Opinion, supra note 86. He believed that
consuls were at least entitled to special legal protection or "respect" when acting under their
sovereign's commission and "for public purposes by their [sovereign's] authority." Id. Article III
of the Constitution does not distinguish between ambassadors and consuls in granting the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving either type of officer.
88. Iredell's Recollection, supra note 86; accord Ravara, 2 U.S. at 298-99.
89. Iredell's Ravara Opinion, supra note 86; accord Ravara, 2 U.S. at 298-99. Dallas's
report of Iredell's opinion is written in the first person, but it is only a cursory two-sentence
summary of Iredell's seven-page opinion.
90. Iredell's Ravara Opinion, supra note 86.
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in cases not only of a flagrant injustice to [a minister, consul, or ambassador] but even of
a supposed injury when one was not really intended. 9 1

Even in a case in which there was no violation of international law,
but a minister nevertheless supposed he had suffered an injury, a trial
by the nation's highest court might avoid misunderstandings.
Iredell then took up the question of whether concurrent
jurisdiction in the lower federal courts was consistent with the
Constitution's evident purpose. He believed that the main problem
with concurrent jurisdiction was forum shopping. There was no
problem in cases where a diplomat was the plaintiff and chose to file a
complaint in the lower court. 92 On the other hand, in cases like Ravara
in which the diplomat is a defendant, the diplomat is deprived of "any
security arising from the Jurisdiction expressly given to the Supreme
Court."

93

Although trial-court errors usually are correctable through the
appellate process, Iredell pointed out that the words of the
Constitution evidently preclude Supreme Ccurt appellate jurisdiction
over diplomat cases. He found that the Constitution expressly gives
the Court original jurisdiction over diplomat cases and, in the next
sentence, gives the Court appellate jurisdiction "[i]n all the other
cases." Thus, the word "other" excludes diplomat cases from Article
III's express allocation of appellate jurisdiction. Maybe the express
allocation of appellate jurisdiction allows an implicit appellate
authority over diplomat cases? Iredell, however, could not "imagine"
that having taken "pains" to provide an express original jurisdiction,
the Framers would have left appellate jurisdiction to implication.9 4
95
Thus, in Iredell's mind, the statute was unconstitutional.

91. Id. In addition to diplomat cases, the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with
original jurisdiction over "Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
In state-as-party cases, he noted that "everyone must be sensible of the importance of avoiding
any just subject of complaint, as nothing could be more calamitous than a misunderstanding
between the United States and one of the members of the Union." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.:
Nor can anyone imagine when so much pains were taken to select these
mighty cases (for such taking them all together they truly are) as proper
objects of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court that if it was intended to
allow of a concurrent Power, either an appeal would be excluded (provision
for which under certain limitations, is made in all other cases) or at least that
they be worthy of any mention in the Constitution.
95. Dean William Treanor has suggested that Iredell did not follow the unconstitutionalbeyond-dispute corollary in Ravara.Treanor, supra note 63, at 539-40. To the contrary, however,
Iredell constructed a constitutional box in Ravara that he could not exit without declaring the
statute unconstitutional as applied in Ravara. In particular, if the Constitution actually
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Two years later, when Iredell recollected his opinion in Ravara,
he suggested another strategy for dealing with apparently
unconstitutional legislation. The statute in Ravara gave the lower
courts general jurisdiction over all federal criminal prosecutions
without specifically mentioning diplomat cases. The Act did not grant
the lower courts an "express Jurisdiction" over diplomat cases. 96 After
reiterating his textual analysis, he concluded that "no one could
imagine that Congress, tho' they might in the hurry of business
inadvertently make a provision inconsistent with the Constitution,
deliberately meant to transgress it.' ' 97 Thus, there was no real conflict
between the Constitution and the Judiciary Act if the Act's general
language was construed as not extending to diplomat cases. In
Chisholm v. Georgia,98 Iredell explicitly used this strategy of statutory
interpretation. He explained, "it is of extreme moment that no Judge
should rashly commit himself upon important questions [of
constitutional law], which it is unnecessary for him to decide." 9 9 He
then construed the act in question so as to avoid the constitutional
problem. 100
precludes appeals to the Supreme Court in diplomat cases, a concurrent jurisdiction in the lower
federal courts is clearly impermissible.
About a hundred years later, the Supreme Court adopted the majority opinions in Ravara
without addressing the problem of appeals. See Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 257 (1884)
(discussing the Ravara opinion); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1884) (same). In Cohens
v. Virginia, the Court held that its original jurisdiction over state-a-party cases does not bar
appellate jurisdiction over state courts in a state-a-party case originally tried in state court. 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 392-406 (1821). The Cohens rationale may solve the appellate problem in
diplomat cases. See Gittings v. Crawford, 10 F. Cas. 447, 450 (C.C.D. Md. 1838) (No. 5465)
(holding that the Supreme Court could exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction over
diplomat cases and citing Cohens for support).
96. Iredell's Recollection, supranote 86.
97. Id.
98. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). For an in-depth discussion of Chisholm, see CASTO, supra
note 20, at 188-97.
99. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449.
100. Iredell's strategy of statutory interpretation in Chisholm is ably presented in John
Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REV.
255 (1994). In administering the Invalid Pensioner's Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243,
243-45, Iredell adopted an improbable statutory interpretation that enabled him to give effect to
otherwise unconstitutional legislation. See CASTO, supra note 20, at 175-78, 252; see also supra
note 85. Under the Act, the federal circuit courts, staffed in part by circuit-riding Justices,
determined veterans' eligibility for pensions subject to review by the Secretary of War. In a series
of advisory opinions, the Justices decided that the Constitution did not permit a cabinet officer to
exercise appellate power over judicial proceedings. Notwithstanding the Act's plain meaning,
most of the Justices interpreted the Act as offering the Justices a nonjudicial office that they
were free to accept in addition to their judicial office. Iredell frankly admitted, "It must be
confessed, that this is not an obvious construction." James Iredell, Reasons for Acting as a
Commissioner on the Invalid Act (Sept. 26, 1792), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 85, at
288, 288.
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Marshall did not mention the doubtful-case corollary in
Marbury, but in my opinion, Marshall probably agreed with this
crucial limitation to judicial review when he wrote his opinion.
Certainly, his brethren who joined with him believed in the
corollary. 10 1 Moreover, all the specific examples that Marshall
provided in Marbury met the doubtful-case requirement that
legislation must be unconstitutional beyond dispute to overturn it.102
His rationale of the people's sovereignty is very difficult to square with
a more freewheeling approach to judicial review. In at least one
10 3
subsequent opinion, Marshall espoused the doubtful-case corollary.
C. Explaining Marbury's Preeminence
Notwithstanding Marshall's abbreviated and question-begging
rationale, most people today view his Marbury opinion as one of the
most-perhaps, the most-important Supreme Court decisions in
history. 10 4 The reasons for Marbury's modern apotheosis relate in part
to the rise of legal positivism. Supreme Court decisions are the law of
the land, and the individual opinions of Justices expressed outside of
Supreme Court litigation are not. Iredell's theory of judicial review
was not expressed in a Supreme Court opinion. 10 5 Regardless of the

101. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
102. Cf. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (2004) (describing the Marshall Court's practice of overturning only the
most blatantly unconstitutional laws, which included situations like the one proffered in
Marbury). Thus, a tax on the export of cotton contrary to the Constitution's specific prohibition of
taxes "on Articles exported from any State," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, would be subject to
judicial review. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). Likewise, if Congress
passed a criminal law contrary to the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
9, cl. 3, a court should dismiss prosecutions under the unconstitutional act. Marbury, 5 U.S. at
179. Finally, if Congress tried to dispense with the Constitution's "two Witnesses" rule in treason
cases, the courts should not yield to Congress. Id.
103. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
104. The numerous law review symposia marking the two hundredth anniversary of the case
demonstrate its place in American history. E.g., Symposium, Judging Judicial Review: Marbury
in the Modern Era, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2557 (2003); Symposium, Judicial Review: Blessing or
Curse? Or Both? A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313 (2003); Symposium, Marbury and Its Legacy: A Symposium to Mark
the 200th Anniversary of Marbury v. Madison, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003); Symposium,
Marbury at 200: A Bicentennial Celebration of Marbury v. Madison as History, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 205 (2003); Symposium, Marbury v. Madison: 200 Years of Judicial Review in
America, 71 TENN. L. REV. 217 (2004); Symposium, Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial
Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003); Symposium, Marbury v. Madison and JudicialReview:
Legitimacy, Tyranny and Democracy, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317 (2004).
105. Nor were Hamilton's and Wilson's theories expressed. See supra note 13.
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merits or persuasiveness of Marshall's treatment of judicial review, it
is undeservedly preferred over Iredell's.106
Marshall's rationale was not particularly strong. Nor was it
original. The power of judicial review already had been expressly
endorsed by most of the other Justices. 107 Marbury, however, is the
first case in which the Court issued a majority opinion addressing
108
judicial review.
Ironically, the Marbury opinion's most glaring weakness has
facilitated its modern preeminence. The most common criticism of
Marshall's opinion is that he failed to explain why the Court's reading
of the Constitution should be preferred over the legislature's
presumably contrary reading. 109 He almost certainly had a powerful
explanation. Like the other Justices, he presumably agreed with the
doubtful-case corollary.' 1 0 Therefore, the conflict in judicial review
cases was not between the legislative and judicial branches; it was the
people versus the legislature with the courts acting as the people's
ministerial agent. Marshall, however, did not happen to state this
powerful analysis in Marbury.
Marshall's silence regarding the doubtful-case corollary has
come to be quite significant. Starting in the late nineteenth century,
advocates of an expansive doctrine of judicial review began relying
upon Marbury to support their anachronistic vision of judicial
power.'
The idea that judicial review is not available in doubtful
cases is quite inconsistent with the modern understanding of judicial
review. In the late eighteenth century, jurists plausibly could claim to
know the people's will as expressed in the Constitution because they
106. In addition, later generations have found it convenient to invoke Marbury in support of
particular political philosophies. See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v.
Madison: The Emergence of a "GreatCase," 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003) (describing how
jurists and legal scholars have invoked Marbury to support various arguments in favor of an
expansive doctrine of judicial review since the late nineteenth century); Gerber, supra note 3, at
7-9 (noting that various political movements have found a hero in John Marshall and have
praised him "for his famous decisions"). Marshall's failure to mention the interpretive corollary of
"unconstitutional beyond dispute," see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text, has greatly
facilitated these later adoptions.
107. See CASTO, supra note 20, at 214-22 (describing the Justices' acceptance of the power of
judicial review).
108. In Ware v. Hylton, the Court overturned a state statute as contrary to a treaty of the
United States. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 285 (1796). Today most would view the case as a
straightforward application of the Supremacy Clause, but a majority of the Court did not clearly
embrace that understanding. See Treanor, supra note 63, at 549-54 (discussing the individual
opinions of the Justices in Ware).
109. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
111. See Douglas, supra note 106, at 413 (explaining that Marbury has been used by various
Justices to expand the power of judicial review).
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personally had observed and participated in framing the Constitution.
Two centuries later, the people's will is not so obvious, and this kind of
analysis has morphed into Framers' intent arguments that are
notoriously slippery. In addition, today's Court routinely exercises
judicial review on the basis of ambiguous constitutional provisions
without regard to original intent. Marshall's failure to mention the
doubtful-case corollary has made it possible to suggest that he did not
subscribe to this corollary.112
Once more the hidden hand of legal positivism distorts our
view of Marbury. Although the other Justices, and probably Marshall
as well, subscribed to the corollary, this limitation of judicial review
was not recited in Marbury, and therefore it is not the law. The
consequence is that as a matter of modern legal analysis, Marbury can
be used as precedent for a broad-ranging power of judicial review. It
does not matter whether Marshall and his brethren agreed with such
a precedent. Whatever they may have thought in private or said in
previous opinions, the jurisprudence of legal positivism dictates that
the principle does not become constitutional law unless it is uttered in
a Supreme Court majority opinion.
D. ExtraconstitutionalPrinciples
Some have argued that the early Justices believed that the
power of judicial review could be used to enforce principles of natural
justice not codified in the Constitution. 113 One of the leading pieces of
evidence used to support this notion is Justice Chase's dictum in
Calder v. Bull, in which he appears to suggest that a court might
resort to extraconstitutional natural law principles as a basis for
declaring a law void. 114 Iredell vigorously disputed the suggestion in
115
his own opinion in Calder.
Iredell's thoughts on resorting to extraconstitutional principles
of natural justice provide another case study of the unfortunate
influence of legal positivism on our understanding of the Founders. In
112. See SNOWISS, supra note 13, at 122-23, 130-32, 152-53, 173-74 (citing specific cases
where Marshall chose not to rely on the doubtful-case corollary to determine the constitutionality
of a statute).
113. See Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844-49 (1978) (acknowledging the
development of unwritten constitutional law, and questioning whether it should be considered a
legitimate part of adjudication); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1145-46 (1987) (explaining that late eighteenth-century Justices saw the
Constitution as a supplement to the natural law, rather than a replacement of it).
114. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798).
115. Id. at 398-400.

394

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:371

the summer of 1798, Iredell delivered opinions in two separate cases
on this specific issue. After Calder was argued in February of that
year, the Justices postponed their decision on the case. 116 A few
months later while Iredell was riding circuit in June, he delivered a
1 7
fully elaborated opinion on the same issue in Minge v. Gilmour.
Iredell did not deliver his Calder opinion until the Supreme Court
reconvened in August.
In the circuit court opinion in Minge, Justice Iredell rejected
the argument that judicial review could be premised upon principles of
natural justice. So long as a legislature acts within the limits written
into the Constitution, he determined that a court may not declare a
statute void.' 18 While the legislature might act unjustly, there is no
judicial remedy so long as the legislature acted within the limits of the
North Carolina Constitution. 119 The legislature exercises "a trust
confided to them by the people ...and it is to be presumed they will
have a due regard to justice in all their conduct."'120 Irresponsible
legislators would be held "responsible, in the only way in which a
legislature can be responsible [i.e., through the election process]."12
Iredell also advanced an important policy reason for refusing to
judicial
review on extraconstitutional principles of natural
base
justice. He found the concept of natural justice fraught with
ambiguity: "The words 'against natural justice' are very loose terms,
upon which very wise and upright members of the legislature and
,,122 In such a case, the conflict would be
judges might differ.
between the legislature's opinion and the judge's opinion, and Iredell
believed that judicial review would be inappropriate. 23 A few months
124
later in Calder,he presented the same argument.
116. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 85, at 93.
117. 17 F. Cas. 440, 443-44 (C.C.N.C. 1798) (No. 9631).
118. Id. at 444.

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
122. Minge, 17 F. Cas at 444.
123. Notwithstanding Iredell's clear rejection in Minge and Calder of natural justice as a
basis of judicial review, a passage in his 1787 letter seems at first glance to be contrary to
Calder. See Sherry, supra note 113, at 1143 (noting the discrepancy between this passage and
Iredell's judicial opinions). In the letter, Iredell wrote:
Without an express Constitution the powers of the Legislature would undoubtedly
have been absolute (as the Parliament in Great Britain is held to be), and any act
passed, not inconsistent with naturaljustice (for that curb is avowed by the judges
even in England), would have been binding on the people.
Iredell Letter, supranote 43, at 307.
This reading is at best problematic. The sentence's introductory prepositional phrase makes
it clear that he was not addressing the issue of judicial review in states like North Carolina that
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Iredell's opinion in Calder is incomplete. He did not explain
why the legislature's understanding of natural justice should be
preferred over the judiciary's. But he did in Minge, his circuit court
opinion. He believed that the Constitution's limits upon the legislature
carried a negative inference:
The [C]onstitution, by saying that the legislature shall have authority in certain cases,
but shall not have in others, as plainly declares everything valid done in pursuance of
the first provision, as everything void that is done in contradiction of the last. 125

Moreover, he linked this negative inference to the people's sovereign
authority. He "inferred" that having placed specific limitations on the
legislature, if the people wished to confer a general authority upon the
courts to resort to natural justice, "this restriction would have been
1 26
inserted, together with others.'
In Minge, Iredell also introduced a nuanced understanding of
natural justice that he did not mention in Calder. Although he did not
believe that courts may use principles of natural justice to void a
statute, he did believe that a judge should use those very same
principles to interpret a statute. Courts should construe a statute "as
consistently with their notions of natural justice ... as the words and
context will admit." 127 He advanced this as a purely interpretive tactic
on the quite reasonable assumption that "the true design of the
legislature" would be to pursue natural justice. 128 Of course, "if the
[statutory] words are too plain to admit of more than one
29
construction," this tactic could not be used.
One might ask why natural justice principles are more
appropriate in statutory construction than in constitutional
construction. While Irede.ll did not address this distinction in Minge or
Calder, in Ravara he noted that judicial misconstructions of statutes
may be corrected by Congress, but amending the Constitution is a

have an "express" or written Constitution. Given the introductory phrase, reading the sentence
as endorsing judicial review based directly on natural justice requires the slender word "even" to
do some heavy lifting. More significantly, Iredell wrote in the same letter that the existence of a
written Constitution made the existence of specific constitutional limits clear and eliminated the
problem of vague unwritten rights "about which ten thousand different opinions may be formed."
Id. at 308-09. This very problem of ambiguity was his central objection to resort to natural
justice in Minge and Calder. Finally, the vagueness of natural justice is quite inconsistent with
the corollary of "unconstitutional beyond dispute" that he stated in his 1787 letter and
elsewhere.
124. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798).
125. Minge, 17 F. Cas. at 444.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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more difficult task. 130 Presumably, Iredell would have found that
principles of natural justice could inform constitutional interpretation,
but only if the constitutional provision were ambiguous and the
existing principle of natural justice were indisputable. Given Iredell's
overarching faith in the legitimacy of the people's sovereignty, it
would have been inconceivable that the people would not want a
clearly established principle of natural justice to be enforced.1 31 This
interpretative strategy keyed to the people's will, however, would
work only when the principle of natural justice is clearly established.
When scholars discuss Iredell's trenchant criticism of the resort
to natural justice, they emphasize his Calder opinion. Scholars
typically ignore Minge or relegate it to a footnote. 132 This treatment is
backward. Minge is the more important opinion, and Calder should be
relegated to a "see also" footnote. Iredell himself undoubtedly
preferred his Minge opinion. He stated expressly that his circuit court
opinion was informed by the oral argument in Calder,133 and his lower
court opinion was significantly more detailed and nuanced than his
Calder opinion. 134 Indeed, Iredell stated in Calder that he was
speaking off the cuff, as it were, because "I have not had an
35
opportunity to reduce my opinion to writing."'
The perverse influence of legal positivism's hidden hand is the
only explanation for preferring the Calder opinion over the Minge
opinion. The opinions were written two months apart and were
significantly based on the same oral argument. One is more detailed
and nuanced than the other, and the author confessed that he
delivered his less detailed opinion off the top of his head. Indeed, his
Supreme Court opinion is essentially an incomplete summary of the
more detailed opinion that he had delivered just two months earlier.
The only conceivable reason for preferring the summary over the
130. Iredell's Ravara Opinion, supra note 86.
131. For example, Blackstone posits a case in which parliament passes a statute empowering
a person to "try as well his own causes as those of other persons." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES *91. Blackstone believed that courts lack power to disregard such a patently
unreasonable act, but Iredell's theory of judicial review provides a different solution. The U.S.
Constitution does not have a limitation that deals directly with this specific problem, but the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause might be invoked. Although the scope of the clause is
patently unclear, Iredell might have resorted to undisputed principles of natural justice to
construe the clause as barring the statute.
132. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 102, at 42 (providing a thorough analysis of Calder
without any mention of Minge); SNOWISS, supra note 13, at 70-71 (same). I must confess that I
have not been entirely innocent. See CASTO, supra note 20, at 229-30 (mentioning Minge in a
discussion of Calder,but only in a footnote).
133. Minge, 17 F. Cas. at 443.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
135. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798).
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original is that it was uttered coincidentally to decide an appeal in the
Supreme Court. 13 6 In today's culture of legal positivism, the
preferment of the partial summary may make sense in the context of
arguing what the law of judicial review should be in the twenty-first
century. In contrast, someone seeking to understand law and society
in the late eighteenth century surely should prefer the more complete
lower court opinion to its pallid Supreme Court summary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Iredell's analysis and justification of judicial review is
comprehensive and powerful. Like Marshall and others of the
founding generation, Iredell saw judicial review as giving effect to the
people's sovereign will. Unlike Marshall, Iredell directly confronted
the difficult question of why the judiciary's interpretation of
constitutional law is to be preferred over the legislature's. Given John
Locke's influential idea of legislative supremacy, this question has to
be answered. Iredell pointed out that the principle of majority rule
creates a structural impediment to the legislative enforcement of
constitutional rights held by those in the minority., He also explained
in detail a number of constraints upon judicial abuse of the power of
judicial review.
Finally, Iredell explicitly grappled with the difficult problem of
enforcing constitutional rights that are ambiguous or unclear. This
was a particularly difficult problem under the unwritten English
Constitution, but Iredell explained that with a written constitution,
the people's will in respect of some constitutional rights is unclear. In
these clear cases, the judiciary acts as the people's ministerial agent in
overturning legislation. In contrast, doubtful cases involving unclear
or ambiguous constitutional rights do not involve the simple,
ministerial enforcement of the people's will. In such cases, Iredell
believed that the courts should acquiesce in the legislature's decision.
Today, some two hundred years later, Iredell's thoughtful
analysis has lost some of its original value. The fault, however, lies not
in Iredell's logic, but in the changed circumstances of American
political society. Today, the judiciary occasionally reviews the
constitutionality of executive action. Because Iredell never addressed
judicial review in this context, we do not know what his thoughts were
136. Similarly, Iredell's careful analysis in a lower court opinion of the Rules of Decision Act
has been virtually ignored. Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, and the
Constitution-A Neglected Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 165 (2006). If by coincidence he
had written precisely the same opinion in a Supreme Court case, the opinion probably would be
famous.
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on this issue. 13 7 Insofar as his thoughts on judicial review of
legislation are concerned, the passage of two centuries has seriously
impeded our current ability to understand the will of the people when
they created the original Constitution. Iredell was a member of the
founding generation. We are not. We cannot know the people's will as
his generation could. Today, most issues of constitutional law that
reach the Supreme Court are ambiguous and would not warrant
judicial review under Iredell's analysis. We simply have a more
flexible doctrine of judicial review today. Therefore, his analysis is
anachronistic.
To a degree, the measure of a Justice's greatness is not in the
person, but in the eyes of the beholder. We do not see the greatness of
Iredell's analysis because his theory does not comport with the twentyfirst-century practice of judicial review. Nevertheless, he offered the
most comprehensive analysis and justification of judicial review ever
penned by a Supreme Court Justice. Moreover, some of his insights
are timeless. In particular, his insight regarding the impact of the
majority rule upon those in the minority is as powerful today as it was
over two centuries ago.

APPENDIX A
138
James Iredell's Opinion in United States v. Ravara

The Question on which I am now to deliver my opinion is a
question of extreme magnitude, as everyone that affects the
Constitution must be. I could have wished for more time to consider of
the subject, but the nature of the case forbids it. If I am in an error, it
is a consolation to me that in this instance, it can do no injury, as the
opinion of the other judges, for whose superior judgment I have the
most respectful deference, is different from mine.
The Question is, whether this court hath Jurisdiction in the
case of a Prosecution against a Consul.

137. Presumably, Iredell would have reviewed a clearly unconstitutional executive action,
but we do not know whether he would have used the doubtful-case corollary in reviewing the
executive action.
138. Iredell's Ravara Opinion, supra note 86. The Charles E. Johnson Papers contain many
of Iredell's manuscript opinions. Iredell labeled this particular manuscript "Copy of an opinion
given by me in the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania upon an Indictment against Ravara the
Genoese Consul." I thank Professor Anthony Joseph for helping me with some of Iredell's more
inscrutable scrawls.
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I am of the opinion that it has not; the reasons of which
opinion; I will now offer as clearly as I can.
It is admitted, and is clear, that the act of Congress hath not
given this court Jurisdiction in this case in express words, and that if
under the Constitution, Cases of this description are alone
determinable in the Supreme Court we have no claim to exercise any
Jurisdiction at all.
The great Question therefore to be decided is, whether under
the Constitution, Cases of this kind are or are not alone confined to
the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The material words of the Constitution to be considered are,
from the 2nd Sect. of the 3d Article and the two final paragraphs of the
second Section (here repeat them).
The Constitution hath therefore provided these things.
1. That there shall be established different courts, viz.
Supreme Court
Inferior Courts
2. It hath directed all those cases to which the Judicial Power
in one or other of these courts shall extend.
3. It hath expressly defined the Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. It hath not defined, otherwise than by Implication any part of
the power of the Inferior Courts, but left them to be provided for in the
discretion of Congress.
In another part of the Constitution among the general
enumerated powers of is this in particular, viz., "To constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
4. It hath selected particular cases, viz: "all cases affecting
Ambassadors, or other public ministers, and consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party" for the original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. It hath provided for no appellate Jurisdiction in such
cases.
In enquiring into the proper construction of the Constitution in
this particular, I will first enquire
(1) What were the probable reasons which induced the framers
of the Constitution to declare expressly that the Supreme Court
should have original Jurisdiction in the special cases mentioned?
2. Whether these reasons, if the genuine ones, will admit of a
construction that will allow of a concurrent jurisdiction circumstanced
as that concurrent jurisdiction must be.
3. Whether the words in the Constitution; will admit of the
construction that the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be
exclusive, if the reasons of the authority require it.
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1. I can imagine no reasons why in this particular, Cases were
expressly mentioned as peculiarly cognizable by the Supreme Court,
but on account of their superior importance to the peace & welfare of
the Union, Ambassadors and other public Ministers have an
extraordinary sanctity of character, as representing the sovereigns
who delegate their authority to them. Consuls, tho' not the
Representatives of their sovereigns, are entitled to their particular
protection as acting under their commission and respected for public
purposes by their authority. The laws of Nations concerning any of
them are not so decided as to be clear of all cavil and difficulty and
there is perhaps no subject upon which a Foreign War might be more
likely to arise than in cases not only of a flagrant injustice to either
but even of a supposed injury when one was not really intended. In
cases in which a state should be a party, everyone must be sensible of
the importance of avoiding any just subject of complaint, as nothing
could be more calamitous than a misunderstanding between the
United States and one of the members of the Union. To secure the
Union as much as possible against any danger arising from such
inherent objects of contention, I imagine was the great purpose of the
provision of the Constitution in question.
2. It appears to me that purpose cannot be answered upon the
supposition of a concurrent Power as contended for in this case. If
such a concurrent Power exists, none of the Persons who are the object
of it has any security arising from the Jurisdiction expressly given to
the Supreme Court unless in cases where he himself can prefer an
original complaint in which cases, according to this doctrine, he may
have an option. But if any Person contrary to the Law of Nations, sues
him or a Prosecution not properly supportable is commenced against
him in any Inferior Court, he has no means of obtaining redress from
the Supreme Court unless the Supreme Court has an appellate
jurisdiction in such cases. Such an appellate jurisdiction is certainly
not provided for in the Constitution and I think it is implicitly
excluded, for when after enumerating the particular instance as
belonging to an original Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, it adds "In
all the other cases beforementioned, the Supreme court shall have
appellate jurisdiction." I think it is the same thing as if it had said, "In
all cases, except cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a state shall be Party." If these words
had been used, I presume no one would have contended that any
appellate Jurisdiction was allowable in the excepted cases, and if (as I
am of opinion) the words used mean in fact the very same thing they
must receive the same construction. Nor can anyone imagine when so
much pains were taken to select these mighty cases (for such taking
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them altogether they truly are) as proper objects of original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court that if it was intended to allow of a
concurrent Power, either an appeal would be excluded (provision for
which under certain limitations, is made in all other cases) or at least
that they be worthy of any mention in the Constitution. When it must
be clearly seen, that any proceedings in courts against Diplomatic or
Consular Characters are more naturally subjects of jealousy, than any
in which they may be original Complainants. There might be reason
for leaving appeals discretionary, and liable to limitations in other
instances, because the value of a subject in dispute might in many
cases not admit of an appeal as without oppression. But in cases of
this nature, the sensibility of national honour would not be excited by
any consideration as a large or small Sum or any minutae of
computation in point of value at all but by the supposition of the Law
of Nations having been violated in the person of a protected character
and therefore it is probable I conceive that if the Supreme Court was
thought proper to be selected as the court of express original
jurisdiction, an appellate Jurisdiction in such cases would likewise
have been given to it. Those who framed the Constitution had
themselves considered a concurrent authority of this nature could
under their own Constitution have been vested in any other Court.
3. These Considerations satisfy me that the framers of the
Constitution must have intended the authority in question to have
been exclusive, and consequently, that it must receive that
construction unless they were so unfortunate as to express their
meaning (if this really was such) in contradictory or insufficient terms.
It is contended, the matter would have been out of all doubt if the
word "exclusive" had been used. I presume it would, and I may say as
to all Instruments whatever if words were used that admitted of no
possible doubt a great part of the business of the Profession would be
cut up by the roots. But it very often happens that in drawing up an
Instrument of writing Doubts that afterwards occur to ingenious
Minds never do to those who are employed in preparing it. This want
of the utmost possible perspicuity may more naturally be expected in
the framing of the Constitution of Government about which the minds
of all good Men must naturally be so agitated that less minute
exactness as to words, is in a manner unavoidable. A fine Writer
somewhere observes. "It is the nature of all greatness not to be exact."
The observation may as well apply to the greatest political object in
which the mind of Men can be engaged as to any other. The Soul is too
occupied with the vast Ideas in contemplation to be capable of
weighing every possible objection that may occur to the meaning of
every word that is used. For which reason the spirit of such an
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instrument as much if not more to be regarded than that of any other
where the words are not in express repugnance to it. I think that
cannot be alleged of the words in question. It is not suggested that the
words "original jurisdiction" necessarily mean Exclusive Jurisdiction,
but that they may mean it if the context requires that construction. No
reasons occur to me why the words are not capable of such a
construction, if circumstanced. If by original, was necessarily meant
original, and not exclusive. There are many superfluous words used in
the Judicial Act of Congress. But it is evident that where they meant
to guard against an exclusive Jurisdiction, they constantly say original
but not exclusive-as if they supposed, without the lettering the
former might itself imply exclusive. It is certain indeed that there are
instances where it cannot be intended to mean exclusive. Such was the
instance given at the Bar in regard to the courts of this State of a
Superior Jurisdiction that was altogether appellate when there were
Inferior courts of original Jurisdiction: The Legislature thought proper
to say the former should have appeal Jurisdiction: they were silent as
to the Inferior Courts. Nothing could be more clear than that this
alone did not take away the Jurisdiction of the Inferior Courts,
because a Law in being cannot be understood to be repealed but by
express words or an evident repugnancy. There were neither in this
case for tho' the word "original" may sometimes mean exclusive, when
the nature of the case requires it, it does not necessarily mean so, and
it was evident no such consequence was intended to follow in this case,
otherwise the Legislature knowing the previous Jurisdiction possessed
would have either actually repealed the former law in that particular
or used words sufficiently expressive of their intention in that respect.
But I must presume, that in framing a Constitution anew with respect
to Courts which are to be created, and must derive their whole
authority from the words of that Constitution the word "original" may
well be understood prima facie to mean "exclusive" because in that
case those who frame the Constitution know no other courts can be
established under it but according to the sanction the Constitution
itself gives and I believe it is an inevitable rule that no Implication
shall control that which is express. [Here two and a half lines are
crossed out by Justice Iredell.] The Power contended for must be
shown to be granted: and is not to be assumed as a matter of course
(under words of doubtful implication) unless forbid, a doctrine that
would lead to lengths of a more dangerous nature and which appears
to me to be utterly contrary to the genius of the excellent Constitution
we are contemplating.
There was one observation made by Mr. Rawle the force of
which I very sensibly feel. That was, that the Congress in the 9th Sec.
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of the Judicial Act have made a provision in the case of Consuls as if
cases of this description were not by the Constitution confined to the
Supreme Court. No man can reverence any opinion of that most
respectable Body more than I do and it is probable that their opinion
is right because it is this day to be sanctioned not only by the
authority of a Judicial decision, but by Individual opinions of far
greater weight than mine. But as I am necessarily obliged, even by a
reference by Congress [illegible] the very section that concerns the
question before us, to give my construction of the Constitution, I must
do it as it appears to my own understanding; however imperfect &
defective that may unfortunately be. Among the many [unexampled?]
blessings we enjoy there is unavoidably one alloy forever mixed with
them. The more free a government is, the more complicated in many
particulars must its laws be in order to guard against every possible
avenue of tort. In the vast variety of cases which must arise under
them new questions will frequently occur and differences of opinion
will of course take place whatever laudable pains may be taken to
prevent it. Happily for us, no case of that kind; not even of the highest
Importance is without a remedy. If any difficulty arises upon the
Constitution itself, a regular & peaceable amendment of it may take
place. If it seems in any act of Legislation, the Remedy is still more
easy. In the meantime that discussion such differences give rise to
may serve more & more to enlighten the human mind on the subject of
the noblest of all [illegible], that by which Public Order can be
reconciled with Individual Liberty, and Law be the successful
Administrator of public & of private Justice.

APPENDIX B
139
Iredell's Recollection of the Opinions in United States v. Ravara

In the Constitution of the United States, is the following
article:
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other cases before
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
139. Iredell's Recollection, supra note 86. The manuscript is mislabeled "Memoranda by John
Jay." The manuscript, however, clearly describes the preliminary jurisdictional issue decided by
Iredell, Wilson, and Peters in United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
Chief Justice Jay was on the Court the next year when the case finally went to trial. Id. at 299
n. 1.
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as to Law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make.
In the Judicial Act of the United States (Chapter 20th of the
first Session of the first Congress) are the following clauses (part of

the

1

3th

Section):

That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a State is a party, except
between a State and its Citizens; and except also between a State and
Citizens of other States, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction and shall have exclusively all
such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against Ambassadors, or other
public ministers, or their Domestics, or Domestic Servants, as a court
of Law can have or exercise consistently with the Law of Nations, and
original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by
Ambassadors, or other public ministers, of which a Consul or ViceConsul, shall be a party. The Supreme Court shall also have appellate
jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several States, in
the cases herein after specially provided for.
In the Circuit Court of the United States in Pennsylvania,
there held before the Judges Wilson, Peters, and myself, Ravara the
Genoese Consul was indicted for a misdemeanor in sending
threatening letters. He was named Consul in the Indictment. (If I
recollect right.)
His Counsel moved to quash it, alleging that it's being a case
affecting a Consul, it was one of those of which the Supreme Court had
sole Jurisdiction, according to the above clause in the Constitution.
After argument at the Bar, and time taken to consider Judge
Wilson and Judge Peters were of opinion that the Indictment was
sustainable in the Circuit Court. I was of opinion, that it exclusively
belonged to the Supreme Court. The motion was, of course, rejected;
but the trial was postponed, and what afterwards became of the
prosecution, I know not.
I have no memorandums of the case at present by me, and
therefore cannot particularly assign the reasons on either side. But I
think the principal reasons assigned by Judge Wilson and Judge
Peters was that under the Act of Congress it did not appear that a
case of this kind was excluded from the Circuit Court, but rather the
contrary; that tho' an Act of Congress plainly contrary to the
Constitution was void, yet no such construction should be given in a
doubtful case; and that in this case, the Constitution, tho' it said "the
Supreme Court should have originaljurisdiction," yet not having said
it should be also exclusive, it was not necessary to give such an
interpretation to it. I think these were substantially the reasons.
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My reasons (so well as I recollect them) were to the following
effect.
1. That the Constitution, having particularly designated the
cases to which the Judicial Power of the United States should extend,
thought proper to select some of those cases as proper for the
cognizance of the Supreme Court, which cases, I presumed, were
particularly selected became such more than others were more likely
to endanger the peace of the Union, and therefore, it was thought best
to confide in all such instances in the highest Court of Jurisdiction
alone.
2. That when the Constitution says "In all cases &c. the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction," it seems, in common
reason, to amount to the same thing as saying that jurisdiction shall
be exclusive, when there are no other general words in the
Constitution giving any Jurisdiction at all in such cases to any other
court, in which case alone, it is conceived, the addition of the word
"exclusive" was material.
3. That the Constitution took care, not only that the Supreme
Court should have originaljurisdiction in those particular cases, but a
general appellateJurisdiction in all other cases, subject only to express
restrictions which might be contemplated with attention and care and
as the words "in all other cases" must mean the same thing as if it had
said "except in the above cases," it follows, (if the construction
contended against be right) that the Constitution intended, not only to
allow a concurrent Jurisdiction in those selected cases with some other
Court, but that there should be an appeal from a decision on any such
case by another court, tho' they be consciously provided one in every
other, thus taking less care of cases which they purposely selected as
the highest subjects of jurisdiction than of any of the most trifling and
unimportant nature.
4. That the Act of Congress had not given express Jurisdiction
to the Circuit Court in this instance; but if they had, and either in this
instance or any other had made a provision inconsistent with the
Constitution the latter as the Supreme law, must necessarily control
the former, altho' no one could imagine that Congress, tho' they might
in the hurry of business inadvertently make a provision inconsistent
with the Constitution, deliberately meant to transgress it.
J. I.
New York, April 21st 1795

